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INTRODUCTION
During the 1975 term the Supreme Court handed down nine
opinions which involved the fourth amendment. In all nine cases
the Court reversed state or lower federal court decisions suppres-
sing evidence. This trend undoubtedly led Justice Marshall, dis-
senting in the ninth case, to state that "[t]oday's decision is the
ninth this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures."'
Beyond such broad characterizations, the nine decisions provide
important guidance for the resolution of recurring fourth amend-
ment issues. This article will examine these decisions under two
rubrics: coverage and protection. Coverage involves the threshold
consideration of whether a particular governmental activity falls
within the purview of the amendment-that is, whether a search or
seizure has occurred with the requisite relationship to persons,
houses, papers, and effects. After this determination is made, the
focus of the article will shift to the problem of the protection af-
forded by the fourth amendment. Protection concerns questions
such as the warrant requirement, probable cause, and application
of the exclusionary rule. These concepts will be treated separately
in this article. Additionally specific attention will be paid to the
differeices between the degrees of fourth amendment protection
now available in an arrest situation and the level of protection pro-
vided in circumstances involving a search not incident to an arrest.
COVERAGE
The continuing division within the Supreme Court concerning the
coverage of the fourth amendment was reflected in South Dakota
1. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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v. Opperman.2 In the past the Court defined coverage through the
application of either a protected area concept,3 an expectation of
privacy approach,4 or a balancing test.5 Some of the lower courts
have also applied a motivational test.6 The question of when the
fourth amendment applies is not merely an academic one but rather
is one which has continually plagued the courts. The question
arises with open field searches,7 prison searches,s the use of elec-
2. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. E.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (taxpayer has no
reasonable expectation of privacy as to tax records delivered to an inde-
pendent accountant because the accountant necessarily had discretion about
what information to disclose); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
(witness legitimately called before a grand jury may not object on fourth
amendment grounds to demand for voice recording because such a witness
has no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his voice, a publicly ex-
posed physical characteristic); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973)
(same as to handwriting exemplars). Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311, 316 (1972) (inspections of business premises of federally licensed fire-
arms dealer "pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expecta-
tions of privacy"; because firearms business is highly regulated, dealer must
have been aware of inspections when he entered the business, and govern-
ment made him aware of authority for and nature of the inspections).
5. The balancing approach has been applied in a number of cases. In
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967), the "need to search"
was balanced against "the invasion which the search entails." See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968). In a more recent case the public inter-
est was balanced against the "individual's right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers." United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975). See also United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (public interest v. fourth amendment interest
of the individual).
6. United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 882 (1968);
United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dictum),
modified in part, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415
U.S. 239 (1974) (inventories of arrestees); United States v. Lange, 15
C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965) (inspections of government property).
7. Compare Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), with Air Pollu-
tion Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). An excel-
lent article discussing this area and some of the others mentioned below
is Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amend-
ment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of, "So What?", S. ILL. U. L.
J.- (1977).
8. Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the
Fourth Amendment out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1976).
In determining fourth amendment coverage in the prison context, the
courts have used an historical approach, eighth amendment approach,
tronic location beepers, 9 abandonment,' 0 plain view," detector
motivational approach, constitutionally protected area concept, reasonable
expectation of privacy concept and application of the reasonableness clause.
Gianelli and Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth
Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1049-64
(1976).
9. The courts are split on whether the use of electronic location beepers
constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Some
courts have indicated that there is no fourth amendment coverage. United
States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976) ( (dictum) -electronic tracking
device in a television set which was used in exchange for heroin); United
States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976) (installation of beeper in
caffeine drum that was later transported by a drug suspect); United States
v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976) (installation of beeper in air-
plane believed used for smuggling drugs into country); United States v.
Carpenter, 403 F. Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1975) (beeper placed into package
after valid border search). However, in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held that placing of an electronic recording
device on the defendant's vehicle while it was parked in a public parking
lot violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. See also United
States v. Martynicik, 395 F. Supp. 42 (D. Ore. 1975) (caffeine barrel).
10. A key question is whether the fourth amendment covers an item left
in a trash container. In determining if the fourth amendment applies, the
courts have applied various tests. In People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486
P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 33
(1972), reaffirmed 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973), the California Supreme Court indicated that an
individual has an expectation of privacy in garbage with regard to all people
except garbage collectors until the trash is so intermingled that it loses its
identity. Other courts have considered where the trash was located. For
example, trash located in public receptacles may be seized at will by the
police. United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971). Additionally,
warrantless searches from containers used in common by building tenants
have been upheld. United States v. Harruff, 352 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Mich.
1972). Most of the earlier cases involving warrantless police seizures of
items placed in a trash container held that the items were abandoned if
the containers were not located in the house or on the porch or within the
curtilage.
See also Franklin, Seizure of Abandoned Property, 1 SFArcH & SEIzuRE
L. REP. No. 13, Nov. 1974, at 1; Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the
Law of Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20
BUFFALO L. Rav. 399 (1971).
11. Whether an item is in plain view may depend on the mode and place
of observation. United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (use
of starlight lens to observe nighttime activities permissible); United States
v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1974) (use of ultraviolet lamp constitutes
search); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973) (use of binocu-
lars to observe cartons being unloaded from vehicle permissible); United
States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (use of mail cover is
search); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (observ-
ing the interior of defendant's apartment by use of 800 millimeter telescope
with a 60 millimeter opening is an illegal search); United States v. De-
Marsh, 360 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (use of ultraviolet light does not
constitute search).
See also United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
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dogs,12 and some types of police surveillance. 3
Opperman involved an automobile inventory in which evidence
was found in an unlocked glove compartment. In a 5-4 decision,
the closest vote of the term on a fourth amendment issue, the Su-
preme Court upheld the search. The Court apparently split four
to four on the question of coverage; Justice White seemingly did
not indicate an opinion. In holding the intrusion reasonable, Chief
Justice Burger assumed fourth amendment coverage without direct-
ly addressing the issue, for the state had abandoned the "contention
that the inventory ... [was] exempt from the Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness.' 1 4 However, in speaking for the plu-
rality, the Chief Justice stated: "Given the benign noncriminal con-
text of the intrusion. . . some courts have concluded that an inven-
tory does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses."'15 In concurrence Justice Powell noted: "Routine inven-
tories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which the private
citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy."' 6 Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Stewart concurred in Justice Powell's analysis.
Their view, that an automobile inventory constitutes a fourth
amendment search, was based upon language in the 1967 decision
of Camara v. Municipal Court.'7 In Camara the Court suggested
v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975); LaFave, Warrantless Searches
and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire", 8 CRn i.
L. BULL. 9, 24-26 (1972); Rintamaki, Plain View Searching, 60 MIL. L.
REV. 25 (1973); Note, "Plain View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides
the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 489 (1974).
12. Gilligan. & Lederer, Searches by Dogs, 3 SEARcH & SEIZURE L. REP.
No. 1, Jan. 1976, at 1; Schuster, Constitutional Limitations of the Use of
Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 973 (1976); Com-
ment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come
Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 410 (1976).
13. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
The court indicated that police department undercover activity at a college
may impose an impermissible chilling effect on the students' and teachers'
exercise of free speech rights.
14. 428 U.S. at 370 n.6.
15. Id. at 370. However, he concluded that even if the inventory of the
automobile was characterized as a search, it was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.
16. Id. at 377 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring), quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). After concluding that
the inventory of the automobile was a search, Justice Powell indicated that
under the circumstances the search was reasonable.
17. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
that it would be anomalous to find that an individual would be
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures only when he
is suspected of committing a criminal offense.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,18 the Supreme Court applied
a balancing test in determining whether stopping a vehicle at a per-
manent border checkpoint was a seizure covered by the fourth
amendment. In United States v. Santana,19 the Court indicated
that a defendant, standing in the doorway of her house, was "not
in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. '20 In United
States v. Miller,21 the Court held that the fourth amendment does
not protect bank records from a subpoena. In speaking for the
majority of the Court, Justice Powell used the term "legitimate"
expectation of privacy in determining that the bank records were
not subject to fourth amendment coverage.
The problems presented by these four cases are best understood
within the context of the coverage issues addressed in the past by
the Supreme Court. The drafters of the fourth amendment used
property-oriented terms--"houses, papers, and effects" and "the
place to be searched." Thus, the Supreme Court initially applied
property law concepts to define the scope of fourth amendment
coverage. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, 22 the Court
held that wiretapping did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment because the interception was ef-
fected "without a trespass" and the conversation was not an "effect"
and that therefore no protection was offered.23 However, as the
concept of privacy gained increasing support as a legal right, the
Court appeared to move away from the trespass theory. In 1961
the Court held in Silverman v. United States24 that the insertion
of a spike mike into a party wall was a violation of the fourth
amendment even though no technical trespass occurred. Thus al-
though the Silverman Court rejected the trespass theory, it refused
to reconsider Olmstead.
The formal demise of constitutional analysis based upon protected
areas came in Katz v. United States.25 In overruling Olmstead, the
18. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
19. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
20. Id. at 42.
21. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
22. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23. Id. at 457.
24. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MifN. L. REV. 349, 363-64 (1974).
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Court substituted a privacy analysis for its protected area ap-
proach:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected. 2
6
However, in Wyman v. James,27 the Court applied a motivational
rather than a privacy approach. Under the former, law enforce-
ment officers seeking evidence for a criminal prosecution were con-
sidered to be conducting a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Conversely, if the objective was not prosecutorial,
there was no search.
28
During the 1975-1976 term the Court added a new standard to
the test enunciated in Wyman. Apart from whether the officers
were seeking evidence for criminal prosecution, the Court inquired
into whether the police were acting justifiably pursuant to their
own procedures as established by their superiors. Giving such def-
erence to decisions made by high ranking officials serves the dual
purpose of increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement officials
and guaranteeing individual rights by lessening the discretion of
the officer in the field.29
Thus in Opperman, the majority stated: "When vehicles are im-
pounded, local police departments generally follow a routine prac-
tice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents."30 The
Court also noted that "[s]tandard inventories often include an
examination of the glove compartment, since it is a customary place
26. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
27. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
28. Uncertainty about the motivational test remains. In a subsequent
case, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the Supreme Court refused
to rule on the motivation approach, even though such a ruling was urged by
the petitioner. Id. at 442.
29. In past terms the Court did not consider this factor. Professor Am-
sterdam criticized Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), dealing with the question of a
search incident to an arrest. In these two cases the Court refused to distin-
guish between rules set forth in police department regulations and decisions
left entirely to the discretion of the arresting officer. Amsterdam, supra
note 25, at 415-16.
30. 428 U.S. at 369.
for documents of ownership and registration."3' The Court stated
that "[t]here is no suggestion whatever that this standard proce-
dure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a
pretext concealing an investigatory police motive."32
In his concurring opinion in Opperman, Justice Powell described
the standard inventory and some of the procedures that were fol-
lowed.33 He noted that there was "no evidence in the record that
in carrying out their established inventory duties the . . . police
do other than search for and remove for storage such property with-
out examining its contents.13 4 He also noted that discretion in in-
ventory searches was limited because they were conducted "in
accordance with established police department rules or policy and
occur whenever an automobile is seized."
3 5
In Martinez, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that
a warrant was not required to make a stop at a permanent border
checkpoint. The Court found that these stops involved little "dis-
cretionary enforcement activity, '36 for the location of the perma-
nent checkpoint was "not chosen by officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most ef-
fective allocation of limited enforcement resources. "'3 Because in-
dividuals may be stopped only at a checkpoint, the discretion of
law enforcement officials involved in open-road stops is controlled
as is the possibility of abuse or harassment.
These recent Supreme Court decisions provide little indication of
the relative importance which the Court places on coverage factors,
such as protected area, privacy, police motivation, and compliance
with procedural rules. Accordingly, those who are faced with
fourth amendment problems lack clear guidance in identifying any
one test which is preferred to determine whether a given govern-
mental intrusion is subject to fourth amendment coverage. The
difficulty in articulating a standard may result from the fact that
31. Id. at 372.
32. Id. at 376. "The Court carefully noted that the protective search was
carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police de-
partment ... a factor tending to ensure that the intrusion would be limited
in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function." Id.
"[F] ollowing standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the country
and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the
police was not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
33. Id. at 380 nn.6 & 7.
34. Id. at 380 n.7.
35. Id. at 383.
36. 428 U.S. at 559.
37. Id.
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no one particular test is appropriate for the wide variety of activi-
ty that gives rise to fourth amendment issues. However, the Court
should enunciate a set of practical rules.38 If workable standards
are not articulated, police, lawyers, and courts will continue using
a trial-and-error method to determine the perimeters of the fourth
amendment. Such a haphazard approach neither serves the inter-
ests of law enforcement nor protects the fourth amendment rights
of individual citizens.
PROTECTION
Once it has been determined that a particular governmental act
constitutes a search or seizure, the focus shifts to a secondary in-
quiry into the protections afforded by the fourth amedment. This
inquiry involves a reconciliation of the warrant clause with the
reasonableness clause and a determination of the basis required to
sustain a search, seizure, or arrest. Until recently the Supreme
Court has indicated in a number of cases that warrantless searches
are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a few specifically
limited exceptions. 39 In Katz v. United States,40 the Court held
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." 41  The Court cited as examples
a series of cases which recognized the automobile exception, 42 the
38. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969); Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies,
36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500 (1971); Dix, Undercover Investigations and
Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203 (1975); Quinn, The Effect of Police
Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25
(1974); Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the
Exclusionary Rule, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488 (1971); Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE LJ. 575 (1972).
39. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218. 219 (1973); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-55, 478-82 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Canmara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
40. 389U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
42. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 & 156 (1925).
emergency doctrine,43 the inventory of an automobile impounded
under a forfeiture statute,4 4 and hot pursuit.45  Other recognized
exceptions noted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire46 are consent,
search incident to arrest, and plain view. The Court has also re-
ferred to a stop and frisk exception. 47
The question of whether these exceptions are few and well delin-
eated has been raised before.48 In upholding the warrantless in-
ventory of an impounded automobile and the warrantless stops of
vehicles at permanent checkpoints, the Court again indicated that
the exceptions may be neither few nor well established. This devel-
opment is particularly significant because of the warrantless
searches which have been approved by the lower courts but which
have not been established by the Supreme Court as exceptions to
the warrant requirement. These decisions have involved a movable
objects exception, 49 airport searches,50 and automobile inspection
stops.51
Requirement for Arrest Warrant
United States v. Watson
In United States v. Watson,5 2 the Supreme Court upheld a war-
rantless arrest of the defendant which occurred in broad daylight
at a restaurant. On August 17, 1972, six days prior to the arrest,
43. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948).
44. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
45. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
46. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
47. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
48. Amsterdam, supra note 25, at 358.
49. United States v. Almas, 507 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1975) (suitcase in van);
People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Waugh v. State, 20 Md. App. 682, 318 A.2d
204 (1974) (suitcase consigned to common carrier). See also Moylan, The
Warrantless Search of Movable Objects, 1 SEARCH & SEIzuRE L. REP. No.
14, Dec. 1974, at 2; Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll
Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IowA L. REv. 1134 (1973); 5 ST. MAnY'S L.J.
187 (1973).
50. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); Gona, The Fourth Amendment at
the Airport: Arriving, Departing, or Cancelled, 18 Vn.L. L. REv. 1036 (1973);
McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Ap-
proach, 41 FORDHAm L. REV. 293 (1972); Note, Airport Security Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUm. L. REv. 1039 (1971).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); notes
162-67 infra.
52. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See Comment, Watson and Ramey: The Bal-
ance of Interests in Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 838
(1976).
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a postal inspector was informed that the defendant was in posses-
sion of stolen credit cards and that the defendant had asked the
informant to cooperate in a plan to use the credit cards for financial
gain. Later that day the informant delivered one of the cards to
the inspector. Although the defendant had agreed to give the in-
formant other cards on August 22, he cancelled the meeting and
arranged for the transfer to the informant on August 23. On the
date arranged the transfer of the credit card between the informant
and the defendant was to be observed by the postal inspector and
other officers. The informant had been instructed that if the
defendant possessed additional stolen credit cards, he was to give a
prearranged signal.
When the informant, who had proved reliable in five to ten pre-
vious occasions, gave the signal, the officers arrested the defendant.
The defendant was then removed from the restaurant and taken
to the street where he was warned as required by Miranda v. Ari-
zona.5 3 After a body search proved fruitless, Watson was asked
if the inspector could look inside his car, which was parked within
view. Watson replied, "Go ahead." After the inspector told the
defendant that anything found could be used in evidence, he
proceeded to open the car door. On the floormat the inspector
found an envelope containing two credit cards and a list of names.
These two cards furnished the basis for the defendant's conviction.
54
Citing dicta from earlier cases, the Court held that an arrest war-
rant was not needed. The Court argued that the warrantless arrest
was justified by the common law rule that a peace officer is per-
mitted to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed
in his presence or for a felony whether or not committed in his
presence. Additionally, the majority buttressed its holding by ap-
plying an historical approach. The Court noted that in 1792 Con-
gress had invested United States marshals with the authority to
make lawful warrantless arrests. Thus, the "balance struck by
common law" in authorizing a warrantless arrest had "survived sub-
stantially intact."55 An unarticulated reason for the Court's decision
53. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54. The issue of the legality of the arrest was important insofar as
it formed the basis of determining that the consent to search was not tainted
by an illegal arrest.
55. 423 U.S. at 421.
was that when a warrantless arrest occurs, the basis for the arrest
can be determined soon after the arrest. 56
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Watson, indicated that historical
reliance was unfounded. He argued that although an officer could
make an arrest for a felony not committed in his presence, common
law defined felony in terms of penal consequences. Unless the
punishment involved a total forfeiture of the offender's land, goods,
or both, the offense was not a felony. Therefore, only a very
narrow class of offenses are common law felonies. The Justice ar-
gued that most offenses now are defined as felonies. Thus, he con-
cluded that the application of the rule in terms of its original con-
text would make the Constitution soon outmoded, for "the ancient
rule does not provide a simple answer directly transferable to our
system."5
7
Justice Powell recognized the anomaly created by the majority
opinion. He noted that the governmental intrusion associated with
a seizure in the form of an arrest is far more serious than the in-
vasion of privacy associated with a search and seizure of property.
Justice Powell reasoned that "[1]ogic . . . would seem to dictate
that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the
same extent as searches."58  However, he accepted the result
reached by the Court because he found "no historical evidence that
the Framers. . . were at all concerned about warrantless arrests by
local constables and other police officers." 59
United States v. Santana
In United States v. Santana,60 the Supreme Court faced the issue
of whether Watson could be extended to allow a warrantless arrest
of a person who was standing in the vestibule of her house. Addi-
tionally, the Court determined which facts were necessary to estab-
lish exigent circumstances in order to permit a warrantless arrest.
Patricia McCafferty agreed to sell an undercover officer some
heroin. She told the officer that she would get it from "Mom
Santana's." The undercover agent obtained $115.00 from his su-
periors and recorded the serial numbers. He met McCafferty at
a prearranged location and was taken to Santana's residence.
McCafferty took the money inside Santana's house. A short time
later she transferred the heroin to the undercover agent.
56. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1975).
57. 423 U.S. at 442 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
58. Id. at 429.
59. Id.
60. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
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After driving for about two blocks in McCafferty's car, the under-
cover agent placed McCafferty under arrest. He asked McCafferty
where the money was, and she responded "Mom has the money."
At that point other officers came up to the car. The undercover
agent showed them the envelope of heroin and told them that "Mom
Santana has the money." The officers then proceeded to Santana's
house, where they saw her standing at the doorway with a brown
paper bag in her hand. When they were within fifteen feet of the
defendant, they shouted "police" and displayed their identification.
Santana retreated into the house and was arrested by the officers
in the foyer. As she tried to pull away the brown paper bag in
her hand, the officers saw "two bundles of glazed paper packets
with a white powder" fall to the floor. The powder proved to be
heroin and provided the basis for her conviction.
The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress on
the ground that the recovery of the bait money required a war-
ranted search. The court also held that there were insufficient
grounds to justify a warrantless entry. The court reasoned that
the doctrine of hot pursuit meant a chase on and about public
streets.
The Supreme Court addressed two issues. First, it stated that
the defendant was "not in an area where she had any expectation
of privacy .... She was not merely visible to the public but as
exposed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if she had
been standing completely outside her house."61 Second, the war-
rantless entry into the defendant's house was justified by a "real-
istic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evi-
dence."62 The defendant's act of "retreating into her house could
[not] thwart an otherwise proper arrest." 63 The Court noted that
the case involved a true hot pursuit situation governed by Warden
v. Hayden.64 However, the Court held that the warrantless search
was also justified by the exigencies of the situation which demanded
action to preserve evidence.
Justice Marshall indicated that exigent circumstances did exist
but that they were created by the officer's action in arresting
61. Id. at 42.
62. Id. at 43.
63. Id. at 42.
64. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
McCafferty. He argued that this action did not demonstrate that
anyone at Santana's home saw the arrest, a condition necessary for
finding that exigent circumstances existed. Justice Marshall be-
lieved that the circumstances indicated a timed arrest designed to
subvert the requirement of a warrant. He argued that if plain view
could be used to justify the warrantless arrest and the warrantless
entry into the house, the defendant "would have been just as liable
to warrantless arrest as she retreated several feet inside her open
door as she was when standing in the doorway." 65
In a concurring opinion, Justice White stated that "a warrant was
not required to enter the house to make the arrest, at least where
entry by force was not required.""" He noted that this is the tradi-
tional rule in the United States and is in accord with interpretations
of the fourth amendment. He criticized Justice Marshall's dissent-
ing opinion by stating that Justice Marshall "would reinterpret the
Fourth Amendment to sweep aside this widely held rule and to
establish a constitutional standard requiring warrants for arrests
except where exigent circumstances clearly exist." 7  This state-
ment seems to confuse the issue in the case. Clearly exigent cir-
cumstances existed, unless, as Justice Marshall intimated, the cir-
cumstances were of the police officers' own making.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in a sepa-
rate opinion. He stated that the warrantless arrest and search
should be upheld as a "justifiable police decision" and "even if not
justifiable, [it was] harmless [error]." 68
In Watson and Santana the Supreme 'Court expressly declined
to follow dicta of its earlier decisions. In Chimel v. CaliforniaO
and Coolidge v. New Hampshire,70 the Court had emphasized its
preference for a warrant, rejecting a broad and elastic view of the
fourth amendment. By rejecting this view, the Court was in effect
returning to the position it expressed in the 1948 decision of Tri-
piano v. United States.7 1 In Tripiano the Court stated that "ab-
sence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was sufficient time
to obtain one, does not destroy the validity of an arrest under these
circumstances.
'72
65. 427 U.S. at 47 (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 43-44 (White, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id. at 44 (Stevens & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
69. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
70. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
71. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
72. Id. at 705 (dictum).
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By not requiring arrest warrants in circumstances in which they
otherwise would be required, the Court seemed to place more em-
phasis on the protection of property rights than on the protection
of individual rights. This anomaly was recognized by Justice Pow-
ell. However, the impracticality of applying the exigent circum-
stances test to the warrant requirement is demonstrated by both
Watson and Santana. In Watson the police could not be sure at
exactly what point they would cross the probable cause threshold.
However, neither did they want to move at the precise moment
when they had probable cause because haste could have destroyed
the ongoing investigation. In Santana immediate action was needed
by the police to prevent the destruction of evidence. Thus both
cases manifest the impracticality of applying the exigent cir-
cumstances test to the warrant requirement. The fact that in these
cases the police might have established exigent circumstances by
their own actions is certainly important. If the police do utilize
their own actions as a pretext for a search of a premises, the
Supreme Court should take appropriate action to rule any resultant
evidence inadmissible.
Particularity
The fourth amendment mandates that a valid warrant must "par-
ticularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.Y 3 This language has been interpreted to pro-
hibit general warrants. The requirement of particularity involves
two pitfalls for the police. First, the description may be too vague.
Second, the description of the property to be seized may be overly
broad. Both these issues were present in Andresen v. Maryland.
74
Andresen v. Maryland
In Andresen an investigation into real estate settlement activities
in the Washington, D.C. area centered on the defendant, an attor-
ney engaged in real estate transactions. The investigation estab-
lishing probable cause revealed that the defendant had engaged
in fraudulent activities concerning lot 13T located in the Potomac
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See The Supreme Court Term, 1975, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 56,76 (1976).
Woods Subdivision, Montgomery County, Maryland. Additional in-
formation indicated that the defendant had misappropriated money
regarding other real estate transactions in the Potomac Woods area.
The warrant authorized the seizure of "items pertaining to sale,
purchase, settlement and conveyance of Lot 13, Block T, Potomac
Woods Subdivision, Montgomery County, Maryland," and listed ap-
proximately twenty types of documents that might be seized. In
addition to the list of documents, the warrant also authorized sei-
zure of "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime
at this [time] unknown."
Pursuant to these warrants, the defendant's two offices were
simultaneously searched during daylight hours. During the search
of his law office, two to three percent of the files in the office were
seized. A second search was made of a real estate development
corporation office in which the defendant was the sole shareholder,
resident agent, and director. This search resulted in the seizure
of less than five percent of the corporation files.
On appeal counsel for the defendant argued that because of the
large number of documents described in the warrant, it was a gen-
eral warrant prohibited by the fourth amendment. Counsel also
argued that the general inclusion clause for unknown evidence was
unconstitutionally vague and violative of the particularity clause
of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court rejected the overbreadth argument, holding
that the mere listing of a series of documents did not make the
warrant a general warrant. The Court argued that because the
investigation involved a "complex real estate scheme whose exist-
ence could be proved only by piecing together many bits of evi-
dence," 5 a listing was proper. Further, to require a specific justi-
fication for each document would allow the fourth amendment to
be used as a shield to avoid detection of complex illegal schemes.
The Court also upheld the general clause permitting seizure of
"other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of the crime at this
[time] unknown." It held this clause could not be read separately,
but rather should be read within the context of the other documents
relating to the crime under investigation. The Court further noted
that the term crime as used in the warrant referred only to the
crime of false pretenses regarding the specified lot. The warrant
"did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for
evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence
75. 427 U.S. at 481 n.10.
[voL. 14: 823, 1977] Evisceration of Fourth Amendment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
relevant to the crime of false pretenses in Lot 13T.' ' 76 The Court
recognized that grave dangers are inherent in executing a warrant
regarding the seizure of a person's papers. However, it found that
the possible examination of unrelated papers did not undermine the
validity of the warrant.
The Court cited Berger v. New York, 77 in which a state eaves-
dropping statute authorizing eavesdropping "without requiring be-
lief that any particular offense has been or is being committed; nor
that the 'property' sought, the conversations, be particularly de-
scribed" was declared unconstitutional.78 Berger illustrated the ele-
ments of fourth amendment law which protect the right to privacy
by prohibiting general warrants. In order for a valid warrant to
issue probable cause has to be shown and the place to be searched
and the items to be seized must be described with some particular-
ity. The majority in Andresen pointed out that all three of these
elements were missing in Berger. However, the Court found in
Andresen that none of the elements were violated. Therefore, the
Court concluded that when there was probable cause to search par-
ticular places for specific documents, the fact that other docu-
ments may have been seen during the search did not violate the
tenor of the fourth amendment to the same degree as would a gen-
eral warrant.
Justice Brennan described the Andresen majority opinion as "con-
sistent with the recent trend of decisions to eviscerate Fourth
Amendment protections. ' 7 In order to assess the validity of this
criticism, reviewing the evolution of the particularity requirement
is necessary.
In Steele v. United States,80 the Supreme Court indicated that
a warrant would be considered sufficiently specific in describing
the place to be searched if the officer "with a search warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended."'s
The Court also indicated that the specificity requirement of the
items to be seized was satisfied by listing the items as cases of whis-
76. Id. at 481-82.
77. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
78. Id. at 58-59.
79. 427 U.S. at 485 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 267 U.S. 493 (1924).
81. Id. at 503.
key. In Marron v. United States, 2 the Court declared: "The re-
quirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to
be seized makes general searches under them impossible and pre-
vents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant."
8' 3
The meaning of the particularity clause of the fourth amendment
was further highlighted in Stanford v. Texas.8 4 In Stanford one
of the officers seeking a search warrant stated in his affidavit that
he had received information from two credible sources that the de-
fendant had in his possession books and records of the Communist
Party, including party lists and financial records. A second affi-
davit stated that the affiant believed recent mailings were made
by the defendant of pro-Communist material. On the basis of the
affidavits, the district judge issued a search warrant. The warrant
specifically described the premises and permitted the search and
the seizure of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, mem-
oranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments con-
cerning the Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of the
Communist Party in Texas.""5
A five-hour search of the defendant's house resulted in the seizure
of two thousand books, pamphlets, and papers.8 6 However, the of-
ficers did not find any records of the Communist Party or any party
listing of dues payments. The defendant filed a motion with the
issuing magistrate asking him to annul the warrant and order the
return of the property taken from his house. The order was denied
and an appeal lodged with the Supreme Court.
Although the defendant alleged a number of constitutional
grounds in support of the return of his property, the Court based
its decision upon deficiencies in the particularity of the warrant.
87
The Court noted:
What is significant to note [about history] is that this history is
largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press. It
was in enforcing the laws licensing the publication of literature and,
82. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
83. Id. at 196.
84. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
85. Id. at 477-78.
86. Some of the books taken were by such diverse writers as Karl Marx,
Jean-Paul Sartre, Theodore Draper, Fidel Castro, Pope John XXIII, and Su-
preme Court Justice Hugo L. Black. Id. at 479-80.
87. Some of the issues the Court did not address are whether the warrant
sufficiently specified the offense believed to have been committed and
whether the warrant was issued upon probable cause.
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later, in prosecutions for seditious libel that general warrants were
systematically used in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries. In Tudor England, officers of the Crown were given
roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to sup-
press and destroy the literature of dissent, both Catholic and Pur-
itan.88
The Court added: "[T]he constitutional requirement that war-
rants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be
accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are
books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they con-
tain."89 It noted that the purpose of the particularity clause was
to limit what could be seized pursuant to a warrant. However, the
Court suggested that the first amendment overtones of the case
might provide a basis for a different result in another case. "We
need not decide in the present case whether the description of the
things to be seized would have been too generalized to pass consti-
tutional muster, had the things been weapons, narcotics or 'cases of
whiskey.' "90
Admissibility of Evidence not Listed in Warrant
If a warrant has authorized a search of specific premises, the of-
ficer may search that portion of the premises. Within that area
he may look anyplace where, on the basis of his professional expe-
rience, he believes the items sought might be found. In the past
disputes have arisen over whether the police officer may seize items
which are not listed in the warrant but which come into plain view.
In Andresen v. Maryland, the Court held that the officer could seize
items that were in their plain view while they were looking for
items listed in the warrant. The Court concluded "that the
trained special investigators reasonably could have believed that
the evidence specifically dealing with another lot in the Potomac
Woods subdivision could be used to show petitioner's intent with
respect to the Lot 13T transaction."91
The Court's approach in Andresen differs from that expressed
in the early case of Marron v. United States.92 In Marron, the of-
88. 379 U.S. at 482.
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 486.
91. 427 U.S. at 483.
92. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
ficers executed a search warrant at the defendant's premises. The
warrant authorized the officers to seize intoxicating liquors and the
articles for their manufacture. Upon entering the premises, the of-
ficers observed liquor being illegally served. They proceeded to
place the person in charge under arrest. During a search of the
entire premises, they seized a large quantity of liquor and ledgers
and bills connected with the illegal activity. The Supreme Court
held that the seizure of the ledgers and bills was not justified under
the search warrant, for their seizure had not been described with
particularity in the warrant.9 3 The Court's interpretation has been
limited in recent years by the development of the plain view doc-
trine.9 4  In light of this development, reliance on Marron has
been incorrect, an inaccuracy rectified by Andresen.
The decision in Andresen did not involve a total "evisceration"
of the fourth amendment or a marked departure from earlier de-
cisions of the Supreme Court. In Stanford, the Court had indicated
that the warrant did not meet the particularity requirement when
the officers sought documents which were arguably protected under
the first amendment. The search in Stanford resulted in the sei-
zure of books and documents, none of which related to the records
of the Communist Party. The Court implied that a different stan-





In Watson some members of the Supreme Court specifically indi-
cated the difference between probable cause to arrest and probable
cause to search. One of the main differences between the two is
the relationship of each to the staleness of the information used
to establish probable cause. As explained in Watson, once probable
cause to arrest has been demonstrated, probable cause will exist
for weeks, months, or even years unless evidence to the contrary
is later uncovered. However, this is not the case for probable cause
to search a person or a place. In the search situation the likelihood
that the items to be seized will be located in the identified place
diminishes with the passage of time.96 A precise rule delineating
93. Id. at 196.
94. United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1973). Not until
the Supreme Court decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), was the plain view doctrine recognized as a separate concept.
95. 379 U.S. at 486.
96. In a concurring opinion in Watson, Justice Powell noted: "Probable
cause to support issuance of an arrest warrant normally would not grow
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when information becomes so stale that probable cause to search
may no longer be maintained cannot be established. Staleness de-
pends upon the type of crime, the location, the nature of the articles
to be seized, and whether the crime is a continuing operation. The
Court in Andresen recognized the problem when it held that a
three-month delay between the completion of the fraudulent trans-
actions by the defendant upon which the warrants were based and
the issuance of the warrant did not negate a determination of prob-
able cause. The Court stated that "it is eminently reasonable to
expect that such records would be maintained in those offices for
a period of time and surely as long as the three months required
for the investigation of 'a complex real estate scheme.'"97
Citizen Informant Rule
When an officer appears before a magistrate to obtain a search
warrant, he may testify on the basis of information supplied by
a third party informant rather than on the basis of his own per-
sonal observations in order to establish probable cause. This for-
mer type of evidence is hearsay which is normally not admissible
at trial. However, such testimony is admissable in a probable cause
hearing, subject to the limits established by the Supreme Court in
Aguilar v. Texas.9 8 In Aguilar the Court held that the magistrate
must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant inferred the location of the items sought. Ad-
ditionally, the individual seeking the warrant must relate some of
the underlying circumstances that led him to believe the infor-
mation credible or the informant reliable.
The second prong of Aguilar has been referred to as a reliability
test. This test was also applied in Spinelli v. United States
9 and
stale as easily as that which supports a warrant to search a particular place
for particular objects." 423 U.S. at 432 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). As
the dissenting opinion stated:
This problem [the time factor] relates, however, to the existence at
the time the warrant is applied for of probable cause to believe the
object to be seized remains where it was, not whether the earlier
probable cause mandated immediate application for a warrant ....
This problem has no bearing, of course, in connection with a war-
rant to arrest.
Id. at 449 n.14 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ. dissenting).
97. 427 U.S. at 479 n.9.
98. 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
99. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
United States v. Harris.100 In each of these three cases, the test
was used to measure the reliability of an informant from a criminal
environment. A number of lower courts have indicated the relia-
bility test either should not apply or should be relaxed when the
person furnishing the information is not an individual from a crimi-
nal environment.' 0 ' Some courts have indicated that if information
is from an ordinary citizen, the reliability test is automatically satis-
fied.'0 - Others have indicated that when the information is from
an identified bystander or victim eye witness, a presumption of re-
liability arises.10 3 A third view is that rather than applying a pre-
sumption of reliability, the courts will be less demanding in deter-
mining when the reliability test of Aguilar has been met. 0 4
Relaxation of the test was recognized in Andresen. The Court
indicated that the affidavits
clearly establish the reliability of the information related and the
credibility of its sources. The complainants are named, their posi-
tions are described, and their transactions with petitioner are re-
lated in a comprehensive fashion. In addition, the special-agent
affiants aver that they have verified, at least in part, the complain-
ants' charges by examining their correspondence with petitioner,
numerous documents reflecting the transactions, and public land
records. Copies of many of these records and documents are at-
tached to the affidavits; others are described in detail .... Rarely
have we seen warrant-supporting affidavits so complete and so
thorough.'0 5
100. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973).
102. United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1972). "We have
discovered no case that extends [the reliability test] to the identified by-
stander or victim-eye witness to a crime, and we now hold that no such
requirement need be met." United States v. Caniesco, 470 F.2d 1224, 1231
(2d Cir. 1972). "Aguilar applies ... on the informant's tip." United
States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1972). The court indicated
that the two-prong test need be applied only when the complaint was based
"solely on hearsay information from an unidentified informant." See also
United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United
States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918
(1976); Thompson & Starkman, The Citizen Informant Doctrine, 64 J. CMuvW.
L. & CRIm. 163 (1973).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973). Other
cases applying a presumption of reliability are People v. Hubbard, 519 P.2d
951 (Colo. 1974); State v. Perry, 499 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1973); State v. Chat-
mon, 515 P.2d 530 (Wash. App. 1973).
104. United States v. Brooks, 350 F. Supp. 1152, 1154-55 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Mobley v. State, 310 A.2d 803, 809 (Md. 1973). "We are in full agreement
with the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals that a different rationale
exists for establishing the reliability of citizen-informers."
105. 427 U.S. at 478 n.9. The Supreme Court has also indicated that
information from non-criminal sources should be accorded greater veracity.
See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (description given by
a victim of a street crime entitled to greater reliability in a stop and
frisk).
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The Court was apparently basing its comments on the citizen infor-
mant rule. As articulated by the lower courts, the reliability test
does not apply with the same degree to a noncriminal citizen. How-
ever, as the Court's opinion indicates the verification, thoroughness,
and detail of the facts also served to establish reliability.
Exceptions to Warrant Requirement
General
On a number of different occasions the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its preference for a warranted search.10 6 Except for a few
"jealously and carefully drawn" exemptions, warrantless searches
have been viewed as per se unreasonable. l 7 The preference for
a warranted search was particularly emphasized from 1967-1973.
However, currently the Court's preference appears to be weakening.
Two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court seem to indi-
cate that the exceptions to the warrant requirement are not spe-
cifically limited. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,0 8 the Su-
preme Court upheld the warrantless stopping of vehicles at per-
manent border checkpoints. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the
Court held that a warrant was not required to establish a perma-
nent checkpoint. Because one of the main purposes of the warrant
is a show of authority, the Court reasoned that this showing was
106. During the early 1950's and before, the Supreme Court took a broad
and elastic view of the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth amendment.
Until recently, the Court emphasized that "definition of 'reasonableness'
turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the [fourth amend-
ment) warrant clause." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
Under the elastic and broad standard of reasonableness, the trial courts
were left with little guidance in determining when a violation of the fourth
amendment occurred. The question of reasonableness turned on the pecul-
iar facts of the individual case. In an attempt to limit the scope of a search
under the exceptions, the Supreme Court stated that a search incident to
a lawful arrest was limited to the immediate area surrounding the arrestee.
In further limiting the scope of the search incident to an arrest, the Court
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), seemed to apply a doc-
trine of inadvertence as a predicate to a seizure under the plain view doc-
trine. The Court may have hoped that this doctrine would encourage war-
rants by limiting the most frequently used exception to the warrant require-
ment.
107. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
108. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
not needed at the checkpoint because of the "visible manifestation
of the field officers' authority."'10 9 Neither was a warrant needed
to prevent hindsight from "coloring the evaluation of the reason-
ableness of a search or seizure." 110  The Court noted that many
of the factors related to a stop at a checkpoint were "not susceptible
to the distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be opened to post-
stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant."'' Addition-
ally, the need for a neutral and detached magistrate was not sub-
stantial because "the decision to 'seize' is not entirely in the hands
of the officer in the field.""1
2
In South Dakota v. Opperman," 3 the Court upheld the warrant-
less seizure of an item from an unlocked glove compartment. The
109. Id. at 565. If no means exist to determine if the person is a police
officer, and even if the person is an officer, the question of whether the
officer is authorized to make the arrest or search presents certain diffi-
culties. A person has the right to protect himself against assaults and to
protect his property. Thus, absent some show of authority, serious injury
might be the result from such an encounter.
110. Id. When a warrant is obtained on the basis of an affidavit, the
grounds establishing probable cause are set forth in the affidavit and can
be evaluated later by the trial judge on the basis of the facts that existed at
the time of issuing the warrant. At the hearing on the motion to suppress,
some courts do not allow the officer to resuscitate the affidavit by testifying
about other facts told the issuing magistrate but not included in the affi-
davit. United States v. Acosta, 501 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1974), modified in
part, 509 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. O'Brien, 22 Ariz. App. 425, 528
P.2d 176 (1974), aff'd on review, 24 Ariz. App. 192, 537 P.2d 28 (1975); Cock-
rell v. State, 505 S.W.2d 204 (Ark. 1974); State ex rel. Townsend v. District
Court, 543 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1975). But see United States v. Pike, 523 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sturgeon, 501 F.2d 1270, 1274 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th
Cir. 1974). This restriction on testimony serves to prevent recent fabrica-
tion which many officers and district attorneys admit does take place. See
Brief for Amicus Curiae, State of Illinois, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33
(1972), reaff'd, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied,
412 U.S. 919 (1973).
111. 428 U.S. at 565.
112. Id. The participation of the magistrate in the issuance of a warrant
has become an accepted premise of constitutional law. The classic explana-
tion of the policy was set forth in United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972):
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers
of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their
duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and
to prosecute [citation omitted]. But those charged with this inves-
tigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their
tasks. The historical judgement, which the Fourth Amendment ac-
cepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily
to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook poten-
tial invasions of privacy and protected speech.
113. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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search occurred while the police were inventorying the personal
items in an automobile which they had impounded because it was
illegally parked. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell indicated
that the warrant requirement did not apply because "[i]nventory
searches are conducted in accordance with established police depart-
ment rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is
seized." 114 Thus, there were no special facts for a neutral magis-
trate to evaluate. He also indicated that one purpose of a warrant
was to prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the rea-
sonableness of the search. Because vehicle inventories are con-
ducted in accordance with standard police department procedures,
"there is no significant danger of hindsight justification." ' 5 A
third reason offered for requiring a warrant was notice of author-
ity to conduct a search. However, in the automobile inventory
situation the owner is generally absent, and the officer involved
has little discretion to exercise, for he usually has no choice about
the subject of the search or its scope."
16
The opinions of the Court in both Martinez-Fuerte and Opperman
recognize the standard preference for the warrant except in those
"few jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions. Both of these
standards have been lessened. The warrant requirement has lost
its paramount status. Justice Powell in Martinez-Fuerte stated
that a warrant would not be required when it would make "little
contribution" toward protecting specific fourth amendment issues.
His statement indicates that if the benefit of a warrant would be
minimal, a warrant will not be required. Additionally, the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement seem to be expanding. In Opper-
man Justice Powell recognized that the automobile inventory was
not one of the exceptions. However, he stated that when the war-
rant granted only minimal protection of fourth amendment interests
and the search was otherwise reasonable, the fourth amendment
would not be violated. These decisions seem to indicate a future
trend suggesting that a warrant will not be required when it would
contribute little to protecting fourth amendment rights. Also the
exceptions will probably be expanded to those searches which are
deemed reasonable under the fourth amendment. This result is an
114. Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 384.
apparent compromise between Tripiano v. United States1 7 and
United States v. Rabinowitz.1' 8 Rather than applying the Tripiano
test of reasonable practicability of obtaining a warrant, the Court
will look to the benefits to be derived from the warrant and to
whether those benefits are sufficient to require an officer to obtain
a warrant prior to making a search.
Automobile Exception
Perhaps the most significant exception to the warrant require-
ment is the automobile exception. This exception was first an-
nounced in Carroll v. United States,1 19 in which the Court held that
a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on the open highway
was permissible if probable cause existed to search the vehicle. The
Court stated that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.' 20 Since 1925, the Court
has decided a number of cases involving automobile searches. The
controversy in most cases has been whether a warrantless search
may be conducted in a vehicle initially stopped on a public highway
and subsequently removed to a public parking lot or police station.
The question was again faced by the Supreme Court during the
1975 term.
Texas v. White
In a per curiam opinion in Texas v. White,1 21 the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless stationhouse search of a bad check suspect's
car. The defendant was arrested at 1:30 p.m. while attempting to
pass a fraudulent check at the drive-in window of a local bank.
Earlier the officers had been informed that an individual fitting
the same description and driving the same automobile had tried
to negotiate four checks drawn on a nonexistent account. Upon
arriving at the bank, the police officers directed the defendant to
park his automobile at the curb. While the defendant was parking
his automobile, the police observed him trying to stuff something
between the seats. The defendant was arrested and taken to the
police station. His car was driven to the police station by another
officer and searched within an hour of the arrest.
117. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
118. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
119. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
120. Id. at 153.
121. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
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Citing Chambers v. Maroney,122 the Court indicated that if prob-
able cause to search the car existed at the scene, a warrantless
search of the car at the stationhouse was constitutionally permis-
sible. Dissenting, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
stated that "[o]nly by misstating the holding of [Chambers] can
the Court make that case appear dispositive of this one."'123 Ac-
cording to the dissent, unlike the Chambers vehicle, this car was
seized under circumstances giving "no indication that an immediate
search would have been either impractical or unsafe for the arrest-
ing officers."'124 A review of the case law is needed to determine
whether the holding in White is inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court opinions.
In Chambers the arrest took place late at night in a parking lot
two miles from the scene of the reported robbery. The defendant
and his accomplices were removed from the parking lot near the
scene and taken to the police station. A search of the vehicle
resulted in the seizure of two pistols found concealed in a compart-
ment under the dashboard. The Supreme Court held that exigent
circumstances existed because the car was "readily moveable"' 2-
and that the opportunity to search was brief. The search was not
found to be illegal even though the car was removed to the station-
house and could have been temporarily detained until a warrant
was issued. The Court held that once a basis for searching the car
existed, it could not determine which was the greater intrusion,
holding the car until a warrant was obtained or searching the car
without a warrant. Therefore, the Court upheld the search at the
police station.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 26 the Court seemed to undermine
the Chambers holding, stating that exigent circumstances did
not exist because the following factors were present. (1) The
police knew in advance that the defendant's car was associated with
a crime. (2) The defendant had been extremely cooperative through-
out the investigation. (3) There was no indication the defendant
might flee. (4) The vehicle was regularly parked in the driveway.
122. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
123. 423 U.S. at 69 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
124. Id. at 70.
125. 399 U.S. at 51.
126. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
(5) The vehicle was guarded prior to being moved to the police
station. (6) No accomplice was known. (7) At the request of
the police, the defendant's wife spent the night at a relative's
home miles from her own residence. And, (8) no proof existed that
anyone else had a motive to interfere with the vehicle.
In order to completely understand the Court's decision in White,
it is necessary to go beyond Chambers and Coolidge and examine
Cardwell v. Lewis.127 The defendant in Lewis was negotiating the
sale of his business. The purchaser employed the murder victim,
an accountant, to examine Lewis' books. The accountant's body
was subsequently found in the front seat of his car, which, in an
inept attempt to create the appearance of an accident, had been
pushed over a river embankment. However, the car had come to
rest in the underbrush at the river's edge. Evidence indicated
that the victim had died from shotgun Wounds.
After several months' investigation, it was concluded there was
probable cause to believe that Lewis was responsible for the mur-
der. The police obtained an arrest warrant and called Lewis to
the police station. He complied with their request, arrived at 10:00
a.m. and was questioned by the police. At 3:00 p.m. Lewis re-
quested permission to see his lawyers. Two lawyers arrived at 5:00
p.m., at which time Lewis was placed under arrest. Incident to
the arrest, Lewis' car keys and a parking lot claim check were re-
leased to the police. The police dispatched a tow truck to bring
the defendant's car to the police impound lot where, it was searched
some twenty-four hours later.
The Court upheld the seizure of the defendant's car, indicating
that its seizure from a parking lot had little legal significance be-
cause the same "considerations of exigencies, immobilization on the
spot and posting of a guard" applied. In its opinion the Court noted
that during the interrogation the defendant's realization that his
car constituted incriminating evidence would have increased the
incentive and potential for the car's removal. The Court attached
little significance to the fact that the evidence obtained from the
car, a mold of a tire and paint chippings, could not be easily de-
stroyed. There was only a remote possibility of anyone destroying
the evidence or of moving the car prior to a warrant being obtained.
However, the Court argued that the automobile was located in a
"public place where access was not meaningfully restricted." 28
127. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion
for four Justices with Justice Powell concurring in the result.
128. IL at 593.
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In White the dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall focused on
the meaning of exigent circumstances as propounded in Chambers.
Admittedly, the exigent circumstances present in Chambers were
different from those found in White and Lewis. In White there was
a possibility that if the car remained in the bank parking lot, the
evidence might have been destroyed or removed before a warrant
could be obtained. The parking lot was accessible to the public,
no one was present who could watch the car, and the car was indeed
mobile. However, no indication existed of an accomplice or a third
party who was working with White. Similarly, in Lewis there was
no indication of an accomplice, and the defendant was subject to
a stationhouse arrest. The Court nevertheless found exigent cir-
cumstances even though the evidence could not have been easily
destroyed and the police had had probable cause to seize the car
for a number of months prior to the defendant's arrest. The pos-
sibility of evidence being destroyed was more realistic in White than
in Lewis.129 As a result of Lewis and White, the limitations on
automobile searches suggested in Coolidge may be applicable only
to the specific facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court has les-
sened the exigent circumstances standard.
Hot Pursuit
In United States v. Santana,130 the district court granted the de-
fendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the facts did not
establish a hot pursuit-that is, a "chase in and about public
streets."'13  Although the Supreme Court agreed that hot pursuit
meant some sort of chase, it went on to state that the pursuit "need
not be an extended hue and cry 'in and about [the] public
streets.' 1132 The Court found that the facts did demonstrate true
129. Some of the lower courts have remarked that White indicates that
exigent circumstances need not be present to employ the automobile excep-
tion. Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975). See also United
States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
However, in United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 583 n.9 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 922 (1976), the court indicated "[wle assume that
if a Supreme Court majority intends to institute such a rule, [elimination
of exigent circumstances] and to depart from its prior approach, it will
do so by express pronouncement to all concerned." See also United States
v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976).
130. 427 U.S. at 38.
131. Id. at 41.
132. Id. at 43.
hot pursuit and that the case was governed by Warden v. Hay-
den.133 The Court stated that Hayden did not use the term hot
pursuit but rather that the search and seizure was based on the
"exigencies of the situation.' 1 34
In Hayden an armed robber entered a business premise, took some
money, and fled. Two cab drivers, attracted by shouts of "holdup,"
followed the robber into a house. One cabby radioed the descrip-
tion and location of the robber to the company dispatcher, who in
turn relayed the information to the police who were proceeding to
the scene. Within minutes the police arrived at the house. They
went to the door, identified themselves, and asked for permission
to search. Because no objection was forthcoming, the officers pro-
ceeded to check the first and second floors. The defendant was
found in the upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. When the officers
on the first floor and in the cellar reported that no other person
was in the house, the accused was arrested. "Prior to or immedi-
ately contemporaneously" with the defendant's arrest, the officers
found a shotgun and pistol in the flush tank of a toilet, a jacket
and trousers fitting the description of the robber's clothing in a
washing machine in the cellar, some ammunition in a cap found
under the mattress in one of the bedrooms, and ammunition for a
shotgun in a bureau drawer in the defendant's room. 1 35 The de-
fendant objected to the admissibility of these items into evidence.
The Court indicated that it was not necessary for the police to
have a warrant prior to the entry, for "the exigencies of the situa-
tion made that course" of action imperative. 136
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in
the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger
their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only
a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have
ensured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police
had control of all weapons which could be used against them or
to effect an escape.
1 3 7
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the clothes found
in the washing machine exceeded the permissible scope of the
search, stating that the inference that the officer was "looking for
133. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
134. 427 U.S. at 43 n.3. The term hot pursuit first appeared in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948). It has since been used in Justice
Fortas' concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310-12
(1967), and in Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
135. 387 U.S. at 299.
136. Id. at 298.
137. Id. at 298-99.
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weapons [was] fully justified" by the record. 138 In Hayden the
Court upheld the warrantless entry because when the police en-
tered the house shortly after the suspect and began to search for
the suspect and weapons, there was probable cause to search. The
Court noted that delay in initiating the search "would [have]
gravely endanger[ed] their lives or the lives of others.1
1 30
One court 40 has interpreted Hayden to require the application
of the hot pursuit doctrine when the police have probable cause
to believe (1) that a felony has been committed and the felon is
within the building; (2) that the offense was a violent crime; (3)
that the arrest was made in the course of an uninterrupted police
investigation; (4) that only a short time had elapsed between the
crime and the entry onto the premises; and, (5) that it was reason-
able that the felon be identified and arrested at once without seek-
ing a warrant.
In Santana the Court implicitly rejected limiting hot pursuit to
violent crimes. The Court also rejected any notion that it was
necessary to establish that the search was made to protect the lives
of the police officers or the lives of others. Additionally, the Court
either lessened the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
exigent circumstances or it arguably switched the burden of proof.
The informant in Santana was arrested a block and a half from
Mom Santana's house, and the police officer testified that word of
the arrest could have reached her within a matter of "seconds or
138. Id. at 300.
139. Id. at 299.
140. Frager v. United States, 258 A.2d 259, 260 (D.C. Mun. App. 1969).
Hayden has raised questions about the delay prior to pursuit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1059 (1976) (although lost sight of, suspect's trail established by circum-
stantial evidence); United States v. Holland, 511 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (thirty-minute delay); United States v. Shye,
492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974) (three-hour delay). Hayden has also raised
questions about pursuit into multiple dwelling units. See, e.g., United
States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976) (pursued into two-story apartment building containing twenty
apartments); People v. Bradford, 28 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 852
(1972) (apartment building with eight to twelve units). Other issues con-
cern scope of search (United States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971))
and cursory review of premises after apprehension of suspect (United States
minutes."141 Perhaps this statement was sufficient to meet the gov-
ernment's burden of proof in establishing exigent circumstances.
However, the fact that the defendant did not rebut this assertion
may have been the controlling factor which led the Court to uphold
the arrest and search. The Court also relied heavily upon the fact
that the defendant was in a public place when she saw the police.
Automobile Inventory
South Dakota v. Opperman
In South Dakota v. Opperman,'142 a police officer placed a parking
ticket on the windshield of the defendant's illegally parked, unoc-
cupied car. The citation warned the owner that the vehicle was
subject to being towed away. Later the same morning a second
ticket for an overtime parking violation was issued. As a result of
the two citations, the vehicle was inspected and towed to the city
impoundment lot.
At the impoundment lot a police officer observed a watch and
other items of personal property in the car. The officer proceeded
to unlock the car door and inventory the contents of the vehicle.
Contraband was found in the unlocked glove compartment which
ultimately led to the defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court
upheld the seizure of the contraband even though in order to avoid
liability the police were not required to do anything more than
remove objects in plain view, close the windows, and lock the doors.
The Court divided 4-4 on the issue of whether the inventory was
a search. However, the opinion indicated that even if the inventory
was a search, it was reasonable.143 The Court's determination of
the reasonableness of the search was predicated on the assumption
that inventories were standard procedure in the police community.
It also relied on the fact that there was no suggestion that the in-
v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972) (when search of house meets
with negative result, search must end)).
141. 427 U.S. at 47.
142. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
143. Id. at 370 n. 6. "Given the benign noncriminal context of the intrusion
... some courts have concluded that an inventory does not constitute a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes." In a concurring opinion Justice
Powell indicated that "routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an
area in which the private citizen has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.'
Thus despite their benign purpose, when conducted by government officials
they constitute 'searches' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 377 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, dissenting, stated that
it would be odd to say that an individual has a right to privacy only when
he is suspected of criminal behavior. Id. at 385 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
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ventory was a "pretext [for] concealing an investigatory police
motive."1
44
In the plurality opinion four distinct reasons for conducting in-
ventories were offered: (1) protection of the owner's property while
it remains in police custody, (2) protection of police against claims,
(3) protection of the police from potential danger, (4) aid in police
attempts "to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and there-
after abandoned."'14 5 Although the opinion did not specify the justi-
fications relied upon, the search was found reasonable. At least four
justices indicated that the protection of the police against possible
claims could not be a basis for the inventory.146 Justice Powell
minimized the importance of this argument by noting that the pos-
sibility of a fraudulent claim being submitted always existed
whether or not the object was in the car.'
14 7
The Court addressed only the inventory of the unlocked glove
compartment. It did not deal with locked containers.148 The plural-
ity indicated the "inventory was not unreasonable in scope ...
[O]nce the policeman was lawfully inside the car to secure the
personal property in plain view, it was not unreasonable to open
the unlocked glove compartment, to which vandals would have had
ready and unobstructed access once inside the car."'149 Justice
Powell noted that the trunk was not searched because it was locked.
The Court stressed that the case did not deal with an "unrestrained
search of an automobile and its contents," but rather with an inven-
tory which was conducted "strictly in accord with the regulations"
of the police department. 150 The Court did not reach the question
144. 428 U.S. at 376.
145. 428 U.S. at 369. Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., an ex-prosecutor and
expert in the fourth amendment area, discounts these reasons for conducting
automobile inventories but implies that the reason for the automobile in-
ventory is to "turn up evidence of crime." Moylan, The Inventory Search
of an Automobile: A Willing Suspension of Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REV.
203, 208-09 (1976).
146. 428 U.S. at 386 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Justice Marshall stated that to argue that the inventory is needed
to protect the police "is belied by the record, since-although the Court
declines to discuss it-the South Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of
state law explicitly absolves the police, as 'gratuitous depositors,' from any
obligation beyond inventorying objects in plain view and locking the car."
Id. at 391 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 385 n.1.
149. Id. at 376 n.10. See also id. at 370 n.6.
150. Id. at 379-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
of the discovery of materials which dealt with "intimate areas
of an individual's personal affairs" and which could "reveal much
about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs."'151
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall indicated that the in-
ventory was not necessary for reasons of safety because the police
had stated that the inventory was undertaken to secure valuables.
He argued that although such a rationale could "not be entirely dis-
counted when it is actually relied upon, it surely cannot justify the
search of every car upon the basis of undifferentiated possibility of
harm."'152 The Justice indicated that if the inventory was not con-
ducted to protect the police, it should not later be justified on that
basis.
Justice Marshall responded to the argument that the inventory
was necessary to protect the police against fraudulent claims by
agreeing with the reasoning of Justice Powell that the inventory
would not minimize the frustrations of such claims. He rejected
the argument that the inventory was necessary to protect the police
against lost property claims on the basis of their negligence. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota had explicitly absolved the police
as "gratuitous depositors" from any obligation beyond inventorying
the objects in plain view and securing the vehicle. He indicated
that if the rationale of the inventory was to protect the owner's
property, and if there had been no express consent, a search must
be conditioned on fulfilling two requirements.
First, there must be specific cause to believe that a search of the
scope to be undertaken is necessary in order to preserve the inte-
grity of particular valuable property threatened by the impound-
ment .... Second, even where a search might be appropriate,
such an intrusion may only follow the exhaustion and failure of
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to identify and reach the
owner of the property in order to facilitate alternative means of
security or to obtain his consent to the search, for in this context
the right to refuse the search remains with the owner.153
Justice Marshall argued that the record showed that locking the
vehicle would have been sufficient to secure it, for a car owner
would feel secure in leaving a car on a street with only doors locked;
151. Id. at 380 n.7.
152. Id. at 390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 393-94. See also Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Auto-
mobile: A Willing Suspension of Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 203, 219 (1976).
"The failure to consult the wishes of the individual concerned makes a
mockery of the claim that the search is in the interest of protecting his per-
sonal property. It would be of small comfort to go to the penitentiary, re-
assured that you are there only because the police were adamant in protect-
ing you from petty theft regardless of whether you wished such protection."
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the Justice could not understand why anything more should have
been done when the car was located in a police impound lot.
The arguments which Justice Marshall advanced regarding the
car owner's consent to the inventory were rejected by a majority
of the Court. Although Justice White also dissented, he indicated
that he did not "subscribe to all" of Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion. Justice White excepted to the discussion concerning the
"necessity for obtaining consent of the car owner," while agreeing
with "most of [Justice Marshall's] analysis and conclusions."
154
Precedent did not provide the Court with clear guidance for
dealing with the factual situation presented in Opperman. In
Cooper v. California,55 the defendant was arrested for selling her-
oin. After his arrest the police impounded his car under a statute
which authorized the seizure and forfeiture of any vehicle used in
the illegal transportation of narcotics. In upholding the warrant-
less search of the vehicle, the Court stated that "the reason for and
nature of the custody may constitutionally justify the search." 156
Because the vehicle was to be held until the forfeiture proceedings
were completed, the Court concluded that holding that the police
had no right to search the car for their own protection would have
been unreasonable.
157
In Harris v. United States,158 the police impounded the defend-
ant's car after making a cursory search at the scene of a robbery
arrest. Pursuant to police department regulations, the officer in
charge was obligated to inventory and remove all valuables from
the vehicle and to secure the vehicle in the impound lot. The offi-
cer opened the door on the driver's side, searched the car, and placed
a property tag on the steering wheel. While closing the passenger
door window, he saw a registration card lying face up on the metal
door stripping. The Court held that the registration card was ad-
missible in evidence, for it was in plain view at the time the officer
was securing the vehicle. Justice Douglas concurred in the Court's
opinion. However, he stated that the search was reasonable "be-
cause ... (1) the car was lawfully in police custody, and the police
154. 428 U.S. at 396 (White, J., dissenting).
155. 386 U.S.58 (1967).
156. Id. at 61.
157. Id. at 61-62.
158. 39D U.S. 234 (1968).
were responsible for protecting the car; (2) while engaged in the
performance of their duty to protect the car, and not engaged in an
inventory or other search of the car, they came across incriminat-
ing evidence."' 59
In Cady v. Dombrowski,'6" the Court upheld a protective search
of a car which occurred five hours after the defendant's arrest. The
local police "were under the impression" that the defendant, a Chi-
cago police officer, was required to carry his service revolver. Thus,
the police believed that a weapon might be in the car and available
to vandals. The Court upheld the reasonableness of this protective
search on the grounds that it was conducted pursuant to standard
procedures in the local police department and was conducted to pro-
tect the public.
Opperman is an important case because it enunciates grounds for
conducting an inventory and because it indicates the inquiry which
the Court will conduct in order to determine if any of the grounds
are present. If a valid reason for conducting the inventory does
exist, the inventory will be found reasonable provided it is not a
subterfuge for a search of the vehicle. The Opperman Court also
rejected the consent theory espoused by Justice Marshall. How-
ever, the Court did not deal with the question of inventorying
locked or closed containers found in the vehicle. Questions con-
cerning the scope of a proper inventory have caused a split among
the federal and state courts.16' However, the reasoning applied by
the majority and Justice Powell would permit inventories of prop-
erty found in locked or closed containers for security purposes if
the vehicle was to be impounded for a significant period of time.
159. Id. at 237.
160. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
161. Some courts have opined that every item in the car may be inven-
toried regardless of where it is located. See, e.g., State v. Wallen, 185 Neb.
44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970). Others have stated that the inventory of hidden
areas may be justified under unusual circumstances. See, e.g., United
States v. Watkins, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 270, 46 C.M.R. 270 (1973); State v. Patter-
son, 8 Wash. App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973). Some courts have indicated
that the police are not allowed to inventory items in locked or closed con-
tainers. Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1971). See also United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1972);
State v. McDougal, 68 Wis. 2d 399, 228 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
In United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion), an "effective compromise" was enunciated: "to permit extensive
inventory searches of seized vehicles, so as fully to protect the police, but to
forbid, over the objection of one having standing, the use of any item seized
in the search as evidence against the objector."
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Inspection Stops of Automobiles
A number of courts have indicated that a police officer may make
selective, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, uniform imspection
stops of automobiles.162 The purpose of these stops is to check the
operator's license, vehicle registration, and inspection stickers. Such
inspections have been permitted under a number of state stat-
utes.16 3 However, at least two courts have indicated that such se-
lective inspections may be conducted at roadblocks or checkpoints
but may not be conducted randomly of single cars absent probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed.
6 4
The Supreme Court last term indicated in dicta that these se-
lective inspection stops are permissible. In South Dakota v. Op-
perman, the Court noted: "As an everyday occurrence, police
stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers
have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or ex-
cessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment
are not in proper working order."'
65
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court stated:
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here, are
used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters .... As such laws are not before us, we intimate no view
respecting them other than to note that this practice of stopping
automobiles briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing
its utility and is accepted by motorists as incidental to highway
use.166
162. United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum);
United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971); State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d
459 (1974); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67
(1975). Cf. State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975) (court
overturned trial court decision, stating that a policeman's reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity was necessary to justify his stopping an automo-
bile); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973) (offi-
cer's stopping a single vehicle without any indication of a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Code was constitutionally impermissible).
163. IDAHO CODE § 49-319; Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.510; N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:
3-29.
164. State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
165. 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
166. 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 n.14 (1976).
Extended Border Search
A number of recent decisions by the Supreme Court have con-
cerned the right of immigration and naturalization officials to make
warrantless arrests, searches, and stops. In United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, the Court broke down for analysis the three types of
"inland traffic-checking operations." These are: (1) the perma-
nent checkpoints which are maintained at or near the intersection
of important roads leading away from the border,' 67 (2) temporary
checkpoints which operate similarly to permanent checkpoints and
are occasionally established in strategic locations, and (3) a roving
patrol maintained to supplement the checkpoint system. 1 8
The two permanent checkpoints mentioned in Martinez-Fuerte
were established near San Clemente, California, approximately
sixty miles from the Mexican border. A large black and yellow sign
one mile from the checkpoint notified all vehicles of the approach-
ing checkpoint station. At the checkpoint two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway stated "Stop here-
United States Officers." The traffic was funneled into two lanes
while a border patrol agent checked the vehicles as they drove past.
The officer generally screened all north-bound traffic. How-
ever, most motorists were allowed to resume their progress without
any oral inquiry or close visual observation. In a few cases the
167. Id. at 552. The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 154 (1925) stated: "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an inter-
national boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." As to the basis for
the searches and the types of searches, see Bernsen, Search and Seizure on
the Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 69 (1976); Fragomen, Searching for Illegal Aliens: The
Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth Amendment, id. at 82; Mil-
chen, Criminal Law at the International Border, 6 SAN DiEao L. Rav.
1, 8 (1969); Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE
L.J. 1007 (1968); Recent Development, Alien Checkpoints and the Trouble-
some Tetralogy: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
257 (1976).
168. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Searches
of automobiles by roving patrols violate the fourth amendment absent prob-
able cause or consent. The fourth amendment permits a roving patrol to
stop a vehicle in this situation only when reasonably founded suspicion
exists and is based upon specific articulable facts that the occupants are
aliens illegally in the country. The Court stated in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975), that only when there is such
suspicion may an officer "question the driver and passengers about their
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspi-
cious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on
consent or probable cause."
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point agent concluded that further inquiry was needed and directed
the vehicle in question to a secondary inspection area. At the in-
spection area the occupants were asked about their citizenship and
immigration status.
The Court rejected a warrant requirement for this type of stop.
The majority noted that the public interest in requiring a stop at
a checkpoint was great whereas the fourth amendment intrusion
was "quite limited."' 9  The stop could involve a brief detention
of the traveler, perhaps a few brief questions, and possibly the pro-
duction of an immigration document. However, the Court viewed
the border checkpoint stop as considerably less intrusive than a
search of the vehicle. The Court stated that the stop would gener-
ally not frighten a lawful traveler in the same manner as would
an intrusion into an individual's house or an arrest on the street.
Additionally, the Court noted that the interference with normal
traffic was "minimal." The Court also indicated that the possibility
for discretionary law enforcement was limited because the "location
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most ef-
fective allocation of limited enforcement resources."' 70 Thus, there
was little room for abusive or harassing stops. Neither was there
a possibility of stigmatizing those diverted because generally all
motorists were afforded equal treatment.
The Court found that the use of the secondary inspection area
at the San Clemente checkpoint did not violate the fourth amend-
ment. The majority indicated this finding would be true even "if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of
apparent Mexican ancestry."'17 Using a statistical basis, the Court
indicated that during the eight days surrounding the arrest roughly
23,000 individuals of Spanish or Mexican ancestry were expected
to pass through the checkpoint. Yet only 820 people were referred
to the secondary area. The Court indicated that this refuted "any
suggestion that the Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent
Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists to the secon-
dary area."' 7 2 The Court also argued that the officials' reliance
169. 428 U.S. at 557.
170. Id. at 559.
171. Id. at 563.
172. Id. at 563 n.16.
upon apparent Mexican ancestry did not violate an individual's
rights because certain characteristics were clearly relevant to
the law enforcement function of the border stop.
In dissent Justice Brennan attacked the "subjective aspects of
checkpoint stops."'71 3 He argued that the statistics cited by the ma-
jority did not indicate whether those of Mexican ancestry were
being harassed. However, the Justice did think that it was quite
likely that those referred were "over-whelmingly" Mexican 17 4 and
that those of Mexican descent would feel resentful and harassed
when compared to the public in general. Justice Brennan rejected
the Court's position that the public interest outweighed the individ-
ual's interest in the requirement of reasonable suspicion and a war-
rant.
Dispensing with reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping
and inspecting motorists because the inconvenience of such a re-
quirement would make it impossible to identify a given car as a
possible carrier of aliens is no more justifiable than dispensing with
probable cause as prerequisite to the search of an individual be-
cause the inconvenience of such a requirement would make it im-
possible to identify a given person in a high-crime area as a pos-
sible carrier of concealed weapons.175
Consent
The consent theory is one of the most frequently relied upon jus-
tifications for a search or a seizure. The consent theory is often
relied upon because it involves little consumption of time plus the
factor that it offers an opportunity to search when probable
cause, either for a search or an arrest, is lacking. In Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte,'76 the Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary
for the prosecution to establish knowledge of the right to refuse
to consent as a predicate for a valid waiver of fourth amendment
rights. However, the Court expressly did not decide whether knowl-
edge had to be shown when the individual alleged to have waived
his rights was in custody at the time of the alleged consent.'
7
In United States v. Watson, the Court held that the defendant
voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle after he had been
arrested. The Court rejected an argument that since the defendant
was in custody, it was necessary to show that he knew of his right
to refuse to consent. The Court stated that consent depended upon
the totality of circumstances. In Watson the circumstances were
173. Id. at 571 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 575.
176. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
177. Id. at 241 n.29.
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"no overt act or threat of force, . . no promises . . . no indication
of more subtle forms of coercion."' 78 The consent was given while
on a public street and not in the custody of the police and the
police station. The Court indicated that the subtle pressures that
take place during a station house interrogation do not take place
on the street. Additionally, the defendant was not "a newcomer
to the law, mentally deficient or unable in the face of a custodial
arrest to exercise a free choice. He was given Miranda warnings
and was further cautioned that the results of the search of his car
could be used against him."' 79
The Court's standard can be criticized for a variety of reasons. By
failing to require a knowledgeable waiver, the Court has favored
those who know they do not have to consent, such as a professional
criminal or educated person. The argument advanced by the major-
ity that a subjective test would hamper law enforcement is ques-
tionable. Either consent is generally obtained before there is prob-
able cause to search or consent is an alternative to a warrantless
search. The Court's decision will also not prompt law enforcement
officials to obtain warrants. Additionally, the decisions may have
the effect of implicitly overruling prior decisions. Finally, the
psychological pressures mentioned in Miranda v. Arizona8 0 may
come to bear upon the voluntariness of the waiver of fourth amend-
ment rights as they do upon a waiver of fifth amendment rights
against self-incrimination. However, the consequences of waiving
the rights can vary greatly. The waiver of a fourth amendment
right does not affect the reliability of the truth-determining proc-
ess. But waiver of the right to counsel or right against self-incrim-
ination might affect a right to a fair trial or the truth-determining
process.
Summary
The fourth amendment has two clauses: the warrant clause' 8 '
and the reasonableness clause. 8 2 Are these two clauses coequal
178. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
179. Id. at 425.
180. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
181. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. "[N]o Warrant shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
182. "The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id.
or should one be considered paramount? A number of commen-
tators and justices have expressed the view that the warrant clause
is the paramount clause. Justice Frankfurter was one of the
staunchest advocates of this position. His dissenting view in Harris
v. United States'8 ' and United States v. Rabinowitz'" became the
majority view in Chimel v. California,'s5 which expressly over-
ruled Harris and Rabinowitz. In Harris he stated "with minor
and severely confined exceptions ... every search and seizure
is unreasonable when made without a magistrate's authority
expressed through a validly issued warrant."180 This same view
was later expressed in Katz v. United States.18 7 Justice Jackson
advocated a position which would have gone even further. He
would have held that a search was prima facie unlawful unless un-
dertaken pursuant to a valid warrant. 88 Other commentators have
also argued in favor of the paramountcy of the warrant clause.180
The fourth amendment itself does not provide an answer. Pro-
fessor LaFave states this failure is "[a]pparently because of an
oversight in the redrafting process." 0 However, Professor Taylor
has argued that to make the warrant clause the paramount clause
is to "st [an] d the fourth amendment on its head."''
The resolution to this dispute is dependent upon whether one em-
ploys an historical or a contemporary interpretation of the fourth
amendment. 92 The issue has been variously phrased:
183. 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
184. 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
185. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
186. 331 U.S. at 162.
187. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions." Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
188. 331 U.S. at 195-98 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
189. E.g., ALI-ABA JOINT CoiMn. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., TRIAL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 28 (Preliminary Draft No.
1 (1967):
The Fourth Amendment ... is somewhat strangely constructed.
It consists of two conjunctive clauses .... But the Amendment
nowhere connects the two clauses; it nowhere says in terms what
one might expect it to say: that all searches without a warrant
issued in compliance with the conditions specified in the second
clause are eo ipso unreasonable under the first.
See also La Fave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further
Ventures into the "Quagmire," 8 CRim. L. BULL. 9 (1972).
190. La Fave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further
Ventures Into the "Quagmire," 8 Caim. L. BULLETIN 9, 10 n.4 (1972).
191. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24
(1969).
192. Id.
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Does the Constitution speak as of yesterday, today, or tomorrow?
By what temporal standards are its words to be measured? Does
the Constitution mean what it was meant to mean, or what it has
come to mean, or what it ought to mean? Are these alternatives
mutually exclusive, or may they be used in combination or accor-
ding to circumstance? 193
An historical approach looks at the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment at the time it was adopted. Under this view searches which
parallel the forcible rummagings of the English messengers and the
colonial customs officials would be impermissible. Similarly, those
arrests and searches that were considered permissible at the time
of the adoption of the amendment would be permissible today.
This approach should be rejected if we have a Constitution that
was "intended to endure for ages to come."'194 Justice Cardozo
stated that a Constitution "states or ought to state not rules for the
passing hour, but principles for an expanding future"'195 and "a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth."'19 Searches and seizures which par-
allel the evils that the amendment sought to prevent should be
illegal. The rights which the amendment was designed to protect
should remain protected.
Although a contemporary approach does not look at the amend-
ment yesterday, it does not totally reject history. As Justice Frank-
furter observed, "the meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be
distilled from contemporaneous history."'197 This approach looks at
the values, interests, and judgments of the Founding Fathers and
applies them to contemporary society to determine the meaning of
the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court's decisions encompass-
ing electronic surveillance, 198 stop and frisk procedures, 199 and ad-
193. Id. at 5-6.
194. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). See
also Amsterdam, supra note 25, at 361-64 & 396. "It is equally indisputable
that the amendment goes farther [than the forcible rummages], both
because the Supreme Court has so construed it for a century and because
to construe it otherwise would render it a constitutional step child." Id.
at 363 (footnotes omitted).
195. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDicrLn , PROCESS 83 (1921).
196. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
197. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 605 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 619 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
198. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
ministrative inspections 20 0 under the umbrella of fourth amendment
coverage demonstrate the utilization of the contemporary approach.
The approach which the Burger Court decides to use will have
an impact on the future decisions of the Court.20 1 In United States
v. Watson,20 2 the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defen-
dant in a public place during daylight hours even though probable
cause for the arrest had existed for a number of days. In reaching
its decision, the Court examined the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment at the time it was adopted. The Court found that at common
law the warrantless arrest was permitted 20 3 and that this rule also
prevailed in the United States at the time the fourth amendment
was ratified. Additionally, the Second Congress had passed a stat-
ute that permitted United States marshals to make warrantless
arrests. 20 4 The Court noted that "the balance struck by the common
law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but
without warrant, has survived substantially intact. '20  Since 1791,
states, Congress, and some commentators have approved warrant-
less arrests so long as they were based on probable cause. The
Court's approach does not reflect strict adherence to an historical
approach, but rather the application of the values and judgments
of the Founding Fathers to contemporary society.
Recognizing the paramountcy of the warrant clause, Justice
Powell opined: "Logic therefore would seem to dictate that arrests
be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as
searches. '20 6 He argued that an arrest was a seizure of the person
resulting in the significant deprivation of freedom especially when
contrasted with a stop on less than probable cause. Since the Court
had rejected property law concepts which provided that the fourth
amendment protects the right to privacy rather than property
rights and since personal liberty is more important than property
rights, he believed that an arrest warrant should be obtained absent
200. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
201. Whether the Court takes an historical approach or a contemporary
approach would make a fundamental difference in whether the use of mari-
huana dogs and location beepers constitutes searches within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. The extent of the coverage of the fourth amend-
ment in prison will also vary depending upon the approach taken by the
Court.
202. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
203. 4 W. BLAcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES 292-93 (Lewis ed. 1902); 10
HALSBURY'S, LAWS OF ENGLAND 344-45 (3d ed. 1955).
204. 423 U.S. at 420. See Wilgos, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH.
L. REv. 541,547-50, & 686-88 (1924).
205. 423 U.S. at 421.
206. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
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exigent circumstances. However, Justice Powell noted that "logic
sometimes must defer to history and experience.... There is no
historical evidence that the Framers ... were at all concerned
about warrantless arrests by local constables and other police offi-
cers. ' 20 7 Although Justice Powell relied on the same historical basis
as the majority he stated: "Of course, no practice that is inconsist-
ent with constitutional protections can be saved merely by appeal
to previous uncritical acceptance.1
20 8
Justice Powell's reasoning has two weaknesses. First, he used a
negative inference, unconcern with arrest, to support the inference
that an arrest warrant need not be obtained even though there was
time to obtain a warrant. His argument runs in the following man-
ner: Common law permitted warrantless arrests, the states and Con-
gress have permitted warrantless arrest; therefore, permitting
warrantless arrests was "not an unnoticed acceptance of history."
Justice Marshall attacked the premise of the argument when he
stated that the common law permitted warrantless arrest only for a
narrow class of offenses and that past history was not readily trans-
ferable to our society.20 9 The Justice warned that "[u]nless the
[historical] approach of this opinion is to be fundamentally re-
jected, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to follow these sources
to any but one conclusion-that entry to effect a warrantless arrest
is permissible.
'210
The warrant clause no longer has the prominence it had during
the Warren Court era. The Burger Court has demonstrated that
the exceptions to the warrant clause are neither few nor well de-
lineated. During the last term the Court added a new exception,
stops at permanent checkpoints, and resorted to the amorphous
exigent circumstances test instead of the well-delineated hot pur-
suit doctrine.
What was thought to be an "absolute rule"-that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances or
one of the previously recognized exceptions-may also be subject
to evisceration. The majority in Watson, Santana, and Martinez-
Fuerte and the plurality in Opperman did not refer to the absolute
207. Id.
208. Id. at 430 (concurring opinion).
209. Id. at 442 (dissenting opinion).
210. Id. at 454.
rule. Interestingly, the rule had been set forth in all other recent
pertinent cases with the exception of Cardwell v. Lewis. The fail-
ure of the Court to refer to the rule was not an oversight. The
rule was mentioned in the concurring opinion in Opperman211 and
by the dissenters in Watson,212 Lewis, 213 Santana,214 and Martinez-
Fuerte.21 5 It may be that the majority of the Court has decided
to adopt a compromise position-that is, the general rule will not
be expressly overruled but exigent circumstances will become easy
for the prosecution to establish. The Court may not want to articu-
late that both clauses are coequal because of the impact of elimi-
nating the warrant clause. By retaining the general rule, the Court
will be able to strike down searches when it believes that a warrant
definitely should have been obtained. If the Court held the clauses
coequal, the police would be able to avoid the cumbersome warrant
procedures.
In those cases in which the warrant clause might apply, the Su-
preme Court has indicated that it will examine the purpose of the
warrant and determine whether a warrant would contribute to pro-
tecting specific fourth amendment interests. 210 The Court has
perceived the warrant as a means of preventing discretionary de-
cisions by law enforcement officials. It can also prevent post hoc
rationalizations of a warrant, for the Court has required that affi-
davits supporting the warrant must be executed prior to its issu-
ance.217 Further, the warrant is a visible manifestation of author-
ity. Thus, in Martinez-Fuerte the Court noted that whenever the
warrant did not contribute to protecting the right to privacy, it
would not be required.
Both White and Santana raised the issues of which facts consti-
tute exigent circumstances and which party has the burden of proof
and the burden of going forward when the prosecution has at-
tempted to justify a search or seizure on the basis of the exigent
211. 428 U.S. at 381 (Powell, J., concurring).
212. 423 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. 417 U.S. at 596 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "The most fundamental
rule in this area of constitutional law is that 'searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
214. 427 U.S. at 45 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Earlier this Term, I ex-
pressed the view that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police
may not arrest a suspect without a warrant."
215. 428 U.S. at 543 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 566.
217. See id. (dictum).
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circumstances-that is, in either the automobile exception or hot
pursuit.2 1 8  In Vale v. Louisiana, the Court stated: "The burden
rests on the State to show the existence of such an exceptional situa-
tion. '219 Thus, the burden of proof has not been changed by the
two recent cases. However, the burden of going forward with evi-
dence has been transferred to the defendant.
220
In its discussions of exigent circumstances, the Court has not
enunciated a particular standard of proof for the existence of the
facts which constitute exigent circumstances. The American Law
Institute has stated that a search of a premises may be made inci-
dent to arrest if probable cause exists to believe that the evidence
would be destroyed or removed before a search warrant could be
obtained.221 The Supreme Court implicitly rejected such a strin-
gent standard in both White and Santana. Any standard enun-
ciated by the Court will vary with the character of the place which
has been searched.
During the 1975 term the Court was not explicit in enunciating
the factors which constitute exigent circumstances. In the past the
Court has relied on a number of factors which in the disjunctive
or conjunctive may establish exigent circumstances. These factors
include danger to the police if they are required to obtain a war-
rant,222 likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or that the
property is actually in the process of being destroyed, 223 evidence
218. Other exceptions the prosecution may justify on the basis of exigent
circumstances are airport searches, searches of movable objects, and emer-
gency searches to save life or prevent serious damage to property.
219. 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
220. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
221. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 230.5 (1975).
222. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971):
Where once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police
inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a
needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence
or to the police themselves-to require them to ignore it until they
have obtained a warrant particularly describing it.
223. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). "No evidence or con-
traband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the
fumes which we suppose in time would disappear." Id. at 15. Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1970):
The police also observed Vale's use of the house as a base of oper-
ations for his commercial business, his attempt to run hurriedly to
the house on seeing the officers, and the apparent destruction of
evidence by the man with whom Vale was dealing. Furthermore,
that one of the parties is seeking to escape,224 ample opportunity
to obtain a warrant,22 ' presence of known accomplices, and knowl-
edge that the premises are a base of operation for criminal activ-
ity.2
2
6 These factors are applicable to a myriad of circumstances:
search incident to arrest, immobilization of vehicle, police surveil-
lance, administrative inspections, stop of individuals, and consent
searches. The Supreme Court's adoption of a middle-of-the-road
position between an historical and a contemporary approach to the
amendment, the adoption of a compromise position between ex-
pressly overruling the general rule that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable and establishing the warrant clause as para-
mount, and the lessening of the exigent circumstances standard
have resulted in an evisceration of the fourth amendment both in
its coverage and in its protection. The primary reason for the
Court's reluctance to extend the coverage and protection of the
fourth amendment is its remedy, the exclusionary rule, and this
Term, the Court failed to extend the exclusionary rule to its logical
extreme.
Exclusionary Rule
Neither clause of the fourth amendment provides a remedy when
evidence has been obtained from an illegal search or seizure. The
remedy formulated by the courts in order to enforce the amend-
ment was first enunciated in Weeks v. United States.227 Commonly
the police arrival and Vale's arrest were plainly visible to anyone
within the house, and the police had every reason to believe that
someone in the house was likely to destroy the contraband if the
search were postponed.
See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 20 CimM. L. RT. (BNA) 3035
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1977). Chief Justice Burger, concurring, indicated that this
case sets forth "a classic illustration of the dividing line between an imper-
missible, warrantless entry and one permissible under the 'exigent circum-
stances' exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement." Id. at
3042. While the police had the fugitive's home under a 24-hour surveil-
lance, the agents observed cartons and other materials being removed from
the premises by unknown individuals. Against the background of the infor-
mation and the past history of the fugitive, the observance of this activity
"would have justified an immediate seizure of the materials being moved
in order to protect the interests of the United States." Id.
224. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
225. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 703 (1948). However, ample
opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant, or to obtain a search warrant for
a car will not negate exigent circumstances. Lewis v. Cardwell, 417 U.S.
583 (1974); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
226. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 40 (1970).
227. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The history of the exclusionary rule is set forth
in an article written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. Ray. 1, 4-10 (1964).
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known as the exclusionary rule,228 this rule provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be offered
into evidence at a criminal trial against the person whose rights
were violated. The Supreme Court found that without such a rule,
fourth amendment rights would be of no value to those accused
of a crime and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution. '229
The exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio.
230
Courts have often stated that judicial integrity requires the ex-
clusion of illegally obtained evidence. This opinion was first ad-
vanced by Justices Brandeis and Holmes in their dissenting opin-
ions in Olmstead v. United States.231 Arguing for the exclusion of
evidence seized through illegal wiretapping, they stated that the
issue of judicial integrity was a moral or ethical question not sus-
ceptible of easy solution. In Olmstead, Justice Holmes indicated
that it was not enough for the Court to disapprove of the way the
evidence was obtained. Rather, he believed that it was better for
some criminals to go free than for the government to "play an ig-
noble part" in admitting the evidence at trial.23 2 Justice Brandeis
argued that illegally obtained evidence had to be excluded in order
to "preserve the judicial process from contamination. '23 3  In an
often quoted passage he stated: "If the Government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anarchy.
'234
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio23 5 reemphasized the
question of judicial integrity: "Courts which sit under our Consti-
tution cannot and will not be made a party to lawless invasions of
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered gov-
ernmental use of the fruits of such invasions. ' 230 However, there is
228. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971), Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting,
refers to the remedy as the "suppression doctrine."
229. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
230. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
231. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
232. Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 485.
235. 392U.S. 1 (1968).
236. Id. at 13. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), placing
emphasis on the "imperative of judicial integrity."
little impact on judicial integrity when the police officer acting in
good faith illegally seizes evidence. In United States v. Peltier,
37
a majority of the Court held that the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule did not require the suppression of evidence obtained by
roving border patrols. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
[I]f the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith
that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the "imper-
ative of judicial integrity" is not offended by the introduction into
evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search
or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evi-
dence seized in that manner.238
The principal justification for the exclusionary rule is the deter-
rence of illegal police conduct. As formulated by the Court, "the
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "239 Any doubts
regarding the reason for the rule were resolved in Linkletter v.
Walker,240 which applied Mapp retroactively. The Court noted
there that "the purpose [of the Mapp decision] was to deter the
lawless action of the police." 241 Again in United States v. Calan-
dra,242 the Court stated that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose
is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment...-243
The Supreme Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule.
In United States v. Janis,2 " the Court held that the exclusionary
rule did not forbid the use of illegally seized evidence in a federal
civil proceeding when the evidence was seized in good faith by state
237. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
238. 422 U.S. at 537.
239. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
240. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
241. Id. at 637. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413 & 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Allen, Due
Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U. L. REV.
16, 34 (1953); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts"
and "Theories," 53 J. Cam . L.C. & P.S. 171, 179 (1962); LaFave & Reming-
ton, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing
Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MIcH. L. Rnv. 987, 1002-03 (1965); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv.
665 (1970).
242. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
243. Id. at 347.
244. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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law enforcement officials. In Stone v. Powell,245 the Court held
that a state prisoner who had an opportunity for a full and thorough
litigation of his fourth amendment claim was not entitled to use
habeas corpus to again challenge an allegedly illegal search, seizure,
or arrest.
In both Janis and Powell the Court emphasized that the "primary
justification for the exclusionary rule. . is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights." 246  Thus, evi-
dence obtained in good faith by state law enforcement officials for
use in civil proceedings is admissable because it does not violate
judicial integrity. Similarly, judicial integrity is not offended by
preventing a collateral attack on a conviction based on a fourth
amendment violation. As Justice Blackmun noted in Janis:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of
evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage
violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area,
however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate, and the viola-
tion is complete by the time the evidence is presented to the court.
... The focus therefore must be on the question whether the ad-
mission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amendment
rights. As the Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is
essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would
serve a deterrent purpose .... The analysis showing that exclu.-
sion in this case has no demonstrated deterrent effect and is un-
likely to have any significant such effect shows, by the same rea-
soning, that the admission of the evidence is unlikely to encourage
violations of the Fourth Amendment.247
Chief Justice Burger has rejected the judicial integrity rationale.
The majority of the Court, however, looks at the nature of the mis-
conduct to determine whether judicial integrity would be violated
by admitting the evidence. When there is an unintentional viola-
tion of an individual's rights, the focus is upon deterrence. The
Court has recognized that although a number of studies were done
on the deterrence of the exclusionary rule, they have not provided
definitive answers. In response to those proponents who claim that
substantial deterrence results from the use of the exclusionary rule,
the Court indicated that the additional marginal deterrence in light
of the costs to society would not justify extending the rule to civil
245. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
246. Id. at 486. See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35
(1976).
247. 428 U.S. at 458 n.35 (citations omitted).
proceedings. Contrariwise, if the rule does not deter, there is no
need to extend the exclusionary rule.
The Court probably will take a utilitarian approach in determin-
ing when to apply the exclusionary rule. If a litigant can demon-
strate that the benefits achieved by excluding the evidence would
outweigh the cost to society, the exclusionary rule should be ap-
plied.
The Supreme Court's refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to
its logical extremes has manifested itself in other decisions. In
1969 in Alderman v. United States,248 the Court refused to grant
standing to a coconspirator to allow the coconspirator to object to
evidence illegally obtained. Similarly, in United States v. Calan-
dra,249 the Court held that illegally seized evidence may be used in
grand jury proceedings to question a witness; and in Brown v.
United States,250 the Court held that a balancing test must be used
to determine whether evidence was tainted. One of the key factors
in this balancing test was the nature of the misconduct surround-
ing the obtaining of the original evidence. The Court stated that
in this situation the secondary evidence must be excluded under
the exclusionary rule.
If the Court does focus on the nature of the misconduct in deter-
mining whether to apply the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained
in good faith should not be excluded because the benefit derived
by excluding the evidence would at best be minimal. However, if
an intentional violation occurs, the benefit derived would be more
substantial. These results will create uncertainty about protection.
Many of the alternatives to the exclusionary rule-for example,
substantive tort actions and a federal common law cause of action
-would not be an available remedy if the officer was acting in
good faith at the time of the fourth amendment violation.
Because these alternatives are usually feasible only when the
officer's misconduct is intentional or reckless, both the alternatives
and the exclusionary rule would be available when such miscon-
duct occurs. Whenever the misconduct is based on good faith, the
rule would not apply. Arguably, this approach would encourage
violations of the fourth amendment because of the difficulty in
showing an intentional or reckless violation of the fourth amend-
ment.
248. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
249. 414U.S. 338 (1974).
250. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
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CONCLUSION
A changing perception of the right to privacy has come about
under the Burger Court. This change is probably what motivated
Justice Marshall's statement concerning the continuing evisceration
of fourth amendment rights. However, this evisceration has not
necessarily occurred because of an overruling of Warren Court de-
cisions. Rather, it has been occasioned by an alteration in judicial
philosophy and by the failure of the Burger Court to carry Warren
Court decisions through to their logical conclusions. Because the
Court has failed to articulate guidelines concerning fourth amend-
ment coverage and because it has refused to extend the protection
of the fourth amendment, there has been a lessening of the right
to privacy in the United States. If the Court were to furnish
practical guidelines concerning the coverage and the protection of-
fered by the fourth amendment, society would be benefited by more
effective law enforcement and by an enhanced right to privacy for
all individuals.
The main reason that the Court has not extended the right to
privacy is the lack of an adequate remedy for fourth amendment
violations. If the remedy benefited society as a whole rather than
only the criminal, the Court might extend the right to privacy both
in its coverage and in its protection. However, until the legislative
bodies can devise a reasonable alternative to the exclusionary rule,
the Court will be hesitant to extend the right to privacy.
